

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TOKYO 14029 01 OF 03 021133Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3758

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC HONOLULU HIWAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 TOKYO 14029

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, CH, JA

SUBJ: SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS: MIYAZAWA-CHIAO TALKS IN NEW YORK

SUMMARY: IN THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND PENETRATING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SINCE JAPAN AND THE PRC RESUMED RELATIONS THREE YEARS AGO, FOREIGN MINISTERS MIYAZAWA AND CHIAO APPEAR TO HAVE DEVELOPED APPROACH TO EVENTUAL SOLUTION OF "HEGEMONY" ISSUE AND CONCLUSION OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY. MIYAZAWA MOVED CLOSER TO THE CHINESE POSITION BY ACCEPTING, AT LEAST CONDITIONALLY, THAT THE "ANTI-HEGEMONY" CLAUSE COULD BE INCLUDED IN BODY OF PFT. CHIAO INSISTED THAT BOTH CHINA AND JAPAN AGREED IN THEIR '72 COMMUNIQUE TO OPPOSE HEGEMONY AND SINCE THERE IS A "WORLDWIDE UNDERSTANDING OF MEANING OF HEGEMONY," THERE WAS NO REASON FOR TOKYO AND PEKING TO APPEND ADDITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TERM TO PFT. HOWEVER, CHIAO INDICATED THAT CHINA WOULD NOT OPPOSE A STATEMENT BY TOKYO IN CONJUNCTION WITH CONCLUSION OF PFT, HE ASSUMED STATEMENT WOULD NOT BE AT VARIANCE WITH THEIR COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON HEGEMONY. CHIAO ALSO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 14029 01 OF 03 021133Z

TOLD MIYAZAWA THAT INCLUSION OF THE HEGEMONY CLAUSE WOULD NOT RE-

QUIRE ANY ACTION IN THE FUTURE BY JAPAN AND WOULD NOT BE USED BY PEKING TO ENGAGE TOKYO IN AN ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN. BOTH AGREED THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA WERE DEVELOPING SATISFACTORILY, THAT NEITHER WANTED THE OTHER TO "BEND PRINCIPLES" TO RESOLVE THE HEGEMONY ISSUE, AND THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO WAIT RATHER THAN "FORCE" A COMPROMISE ON HEGEMONY WHICH COULD HARM GOOD RELATIONS.

AS RESULT OF MIYAZAWA-CHIAO CONVERSATIONS, TREATY NEGOTIATIONS ARE LEFT ABOUT WHERE BOTH SIDES WANT THEM AT MOMENT, ALIVE, BUT NOT MOVING VERY FAST. END SUMMARY.

--THE TALKS

1. DURING TEN HOURS OF TALKS IN NEW YORK, FONMIN MIYAZAWA AND PRC FONMIN CHIAO KUAN-HUA PRESENTED AND PROBEED THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF JAPAN AND CHINA. DESPITE BASIC DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH, THE OUTLINES OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION OF THE "HEGEMONY ISSUE" SEEM TO HAVE APPEARED. CHINA DIVDIR FUJITA, WHO PARTICIPATED THROUGHOUT THE TALKS, PROVIDED US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS AND OF THEIR SIGNIFICANCE. AS HOST OF FIRST MEETING, MIYAZAWA BEGAN PRESENTATION WITH DISCUSSION OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN MOST BASIC SENSE - BECAUSE OF PEACE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, TOKYO MUST MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBORS AND INDEED WITH ALL COUNTRIES. JAPAN HAD NEITHER THE WILL NOR THE (MILITARY) MEANS TO OPPOSE ANY HEGEMONIC ACTS. MIYAZAWA EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF AND RESPECT FOR CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS POSITION ON HEGEMONY. DIFFERENCES JAPAN AND CHINA HAVE ON FOREIGN POLICY NEED NOT PREVENT DEVELOPMENT OF GOOD RELATIONS. JAPAN AND CHINA AGREED IN '72 COMMUNIQUE ON OPPOSITION TO HEGEMONY AND JAPAN'S ATTITUDE HAS NOT CHANGED. BUT FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL REASONS, JAPAN COULD NOT SUBSCRIBE TO A TREATY WHICH SEEMED TO BE DIRECTED AT A THIRD COUNTRY OR WHICH REQUIRED ANY UNILATERAL OR JOINT ACTION BY JAPAN AND CHINA.

2. CHIAO KUAN-HUA THEN DISCUSSED IN DEPTH BASIC ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF CHINA. HE DID NOT DIRECTLY RESPOND TO PRESENTATION MADE BY MIYAZAWA, BUT IT WAS APPARENT THAT CHIAO (AND THE CHINESE) "PRESUMED" THAT MIYAZAWA INTENDED TO PROPOSE ISSUANCE OF PROTOCOLS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH SIGNING THE PFT STATING THE POSITIONS OF JAPAN AND CHINA ON HEGEMONY. (FUJITA SAID CHINESE ASSUMPTION WAS PROBABLY BASED ON PRESS REPORTS IN TOKYO THAT MIYAZAWA WOULD PRO-

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 TOKYO 14029 01 OF 03 021133Z

POSE EXPLANATORY PROTOCOLS. MIYAZAWA DID NOT AND NEVER INTENDED TO PROPOSE SUCH IN THE MEETINGS WITH CHIAO.) CHIAO SAID THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE. CHINA AND JAPAN HAD AGREED TO OPPOSE HEGEMONY IN THE '72 COMMUNIQUE AND NO FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OR INTERPRETATIONS WERE REQUIRED. THE "WORLDWIDE UNDERSTANDING OF THE EARNING OF HEGEMONY" WAS CLEAR ENOUGH. (FUJITA COMMENTED THAT CHIAO'S "WORLDWIDE UNDERSTANDING..." WAS REMARKABLY CLOSE TO PM MIKI'S "HEGEMONY AS A UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE OF PEACE", A PHRASE WHICH MIYAZAWA DID NOT EMPLOY.

MIYAZAWA ADVOCATED INSTEAD THAT THE PFT NOT VIOLATE "PRINCIPLES OF UN CHARTER.")

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 14029 02 OF 03 021201Z

53

ACTION EA-06

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 TOKYO 14029

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3. CHIAO EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFICULTIES JAPAN HAD WITH THE HEGEMONY CLAUSE AND HE STRESSED THAT CHINA WAS SATISFIED WITH THE '72 COMMUNIQUE; RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA WERE IMPROVING STEADILY AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO WHETHER OR NOT THE PFT WAS CONCLUDED.

4. MIYAZAWA HAD NOT INTENDED TO BRING UP THE TREATY OR HEGEMONY SUBJECTS AGAIN AT THE SECOND MEETING SEPT 29, HOSTED BY CHIAO. HE FELT THAT THE PREVIOUS EXCHANGE HAD CLARIFIED THE ATTITUDES OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND NO FURTHER EXCHANGE ON THE SUBJECT WAS NECESSARY. CHIAO REITERATED THAT THERE COULD NOT BE TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF "HEGEMONY" BUT HE INDICATED THAT CHINA COULD NOT OPPOSE STATEMENT BY JAPAN, IN CONJUNCTION WITH CONCLUSION OF FPT, SETTING FORTH THE JAPANESE INTERPRETATION OF HEGEMONY CLAUSE. HE ASSUMED, OF COURSE, THAT ANY SUCH INTERPRETATION WOULD NOT CONTRADICT THE COMMON UNDER-

STANDING OF THE MEANING OF HEGEMONY. FUJITA INTERPRETED CHIAO TO MEAN THAT SINCE A "UNIFIED INTERPRETATION" OF HEGEMONY (REF B) ALREADY EXISTED FROM TIME OF '72 COMMUNIQUE, THERE WAS NO NEED FOR CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 14029 02 OF 03 021201Z

FURTHER JOINT CLARIFICATION AND, PRESUMABLY, ANY STATEMENT JAPAN MIGHT MAKE WOULD NOT VIOLATE THEIR COMMON UNDERSTANDING.

5. FINALLY, BOTH FONMINS AGREED THAT RELATIONS WERE IMPROVING SATISFACTORILY AND A "FORCED" CONCLUSION OF THE PFT MIGHT HARM GOOD RELATIONS. NEITHER CHINA NOR JAPAN SHOULD BEND ITS PRINCIPLES TO ACCEPT THE OTHER'S POSITION ON THE PFT. IT WAS PREFERABLE TO WAIT IF NECESSARY.

6. AS FOR THE NEXT STEP, FUJITA SAID THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FONMINS AS TO WHAT PROCESSES OR CHANNELS FURTHER DISCUSSIONS MIGHT TAKE, OR INDEED THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY FURTHER CONTACT ON THE SUBJECT. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESS, MIYAZAWA LEFT THE NEXT INITIATIVE WITH THE CHINESE (A MOVE FUJITA TERMED "CLEVER.") HOWEVER, FUJITA SAID THAT IN FACT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE JAPAN WHICH WOULD TAKE THE NEXT STEP. MIYAZAWA RETURNED TO TOKYO OCT 1 AND THE TALKS WITH PM MIKI OCT 2. DECISIONS WILL BE MADE THEREAFTER ON HOW TO PROCEED. IN ANY CASE, MIYAZAWA BOUGHT TIME BY TELLING PRESS THAT HE EXPECTED IT WOULD TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS BEFORE THE CHINESE HAD TIME TO STUDY THE TALKS AND RESPOND, IF THEY CHOSE TO DO SO.

7. EMBOFF SUGGESTED TO FUJITA THAT THERE NOW APPEARED THREE POSSIBLE PATHS TO PURSUE:

A) REPHRASE CLAUSE SEVEN, THE HEGEMONY CLAUSE, OF '72 COMMUNIQUE;

B) JAPAN COULD ISSUE UNILATERAL, STATEMENT OF CLARIFICATION AT TIME OF CONCLUSION PFT THAT HEGEMONY CLAUSE WAS NOT DIRECTED AT A THIRD PARTY;

C) CLAUSES SIX (SOVEREIGNTY, NON-INTERFERENCE, ETC) AND SEVEN COULD BE MERGED AS "UNIVERSAL PEACE PRINCIPLES - PM MIKI'S APPROACH. FUJITA FIRST RULED OUT POSSIBILITY (C). CHIAO MADE CLEAR THAT PEKING WANTS A SEPARATE HEGEMONY CLAUSE. FUJITA SAID HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT POSSIBILITIES (A) AND (B) OR A COMBINATION OF THE TWO ARE THE MOST PROMISING. (FUJITA ALSO CONFIRMED THAT PEKING HAS SOUGHT A REITERATION OF CLAUSE SEVEN AND HAS NEVER, AS SOME JOURNALISTS AND LDP CONSERVATIVES PURPORTEDLY BELIEVE, ASKED FOR A CLAUSE MORE EXPLICITLY OPPOSING "SOVIET" HEGEMONY.)

--THE TOKYO SCENE AND THE PRESS

8. THE RELATIVELY PESSIMISTIC REPORTS IN PRESS BASED ON MIYAZAWA'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK AFTER THE SECOND ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS
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PAGE 03 TOKYO 14029 02 OF 03 021201Z

WERE MISLEADING, EVEN TO SOME EXTENT TO THE FONOFF (REF B). THEY WERE ALSO A MATTER OF CONCERN TO PM MIKI, WHO, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, FUJITA SAID, DID NOT WANT:

A) THE TALKS TO APPEAR TO BE "FORZEN" SINCE THIS WOULD REPRESENT A FAILURE FOR MIKI TO OBTAIN HIS CURRENT PRIMARY FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE; OR

B) FOR IT TO APPEAR THAT A BREAKTHROUGH WAS IMMINENT, THEREBY CREATING PRESSURE FOR MOVEMENT AND AROUSING THE INSATIABLE CURIOSITY BY THE TOKYO PRESS OF DEVELOPMENTS (WHICH COULD UNDERMINE THE PROGRESS MADE IN NEW YORK).

9. MIYAZAWA DELIBERATELY EMPHASIZED DIFFICULTIES AND DIFFERENCES IN NEW YORK, FUJITA SAID, AND AS A RESULT, THE TOKYO PRESS CONCLUDED THAT THE PFT WAS IN EFFECT FROZEN. TO COUNTER THIS IMPRESSION SOMEWHAT, MIKI URGED VICE FONMIN SATO TO GIVE THE TOKYO PRESS A SLIGHTLY MORE OPTIMISTIC PICTURE WITHOUT IMPLYING THAT A BREAKTHROUGH WAS IMMINENT. IN HIS SEPT 29 BACKGROUNDER AMIDST NUMEROUS, MORE CAUTIOUS REMARKS, SATO SAID THAT DEPENDING ON WORDING PROPOSED BY BOTH SIDES FOR AN ANTI-HEGEMONY PROVISIONS, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO REACH A COMPROMISE WITHOUT BENDING BASIC PRINCIPLES.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 14029 03 OF 03 021212Z

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C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 3 TOKYO 14029

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10. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD ON HIS RETURN TO TOKYO OCT 1, MIYAZAWA ALSO TOOK A SLIGHTLY MORE HOPEFUL LINE. HE EXPLAINED THAT RELATIONS WITH CHINA WERE SATISFACTORY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF THE PFT, BUT THEN HE SAID, (EXPOSING HIS INTENTIONS, WE ASSUME) HE FELT CHINA WOULD NOT FORCE JAPAN TO TAKE "JOINT ACTION" AGAINST A SPECIFIC THIRD COUNTRY EVEN IF JAPAN AGREED TO INCLUDE THE CONTROVERSIAL ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE IN PFT. CHINA WOULD NOT, MIYAZAWA QUOTED CHIAO AS SAYING, SEEK ANY ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION JOINTLY WITH JAPAN ALTHOUGH PEKING SUPPORTS THE JAPANESE DEMAND FOR REVERSION OF THE SOVIET HELD NORTHERN TERRITORIES. CHIAO TOLD HIM THE SAME WOULD APPLY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA EVEN IF PFT CONTAINS THE ANTI-HEGEMONY PROVISION. THUS, MIYAZAWA CONCLUDED CHIAO MEANT THAT CHINA WILL NOT FORCE JAPAN TO TAKE PART IN A JOINT ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN IN THE FUTURE EVEN IF THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE IS INCORPORATED IN PFT.

11. COMMENT: THE MIYAZAWA-CHIAO EXCHANGES WERE THOROUGH AND THE MOST PENETRATING TO BE HELD BETWEEN LEADERS OF JAPAN AND CHINA
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 14029 03 OF 03 021212Z

SINCE THE RELATIONSHIP RESUMED IN 1972, AND, AS SUCH, ARE A LAND-MARK IN THE RELATIONSHIP. FUJITA COMMENTED THAT WHETHER OR NOT THE PFT IS SOON CONCLUDED THE TALKS PERMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME A COMPREHENSIVE AND LUCID EXCHANGE AT HIGH POLITICAL LEVELS. THE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ADVANCED THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH UP TO NOW HAS REMAINED SLUGGISH, IN CONTRAST TO THE BUSY ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. AT THE SAME TIME JAPAN HAS DEMONSTRATED SENSITIVITY TO SOVIET VIEWS WITHOUT (PERMITTING) ALLOWING MOSCOW TO DICTATE PACE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

12. PROSPECTS FOR EVENTUAL PFT EVENTUAL CONCLUSION OF PFT HAVE IMPROVED BECAUSE MIYAZAWA HAS MADE CLEAR TO PEKING THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL, DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS WHICH RENDER DIFFICULT UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE JAPAN OF PEKING'S POSITION ON HEGEMONY.

13. WHILE MAINTAINING CHINESE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UNYIELDING STANCE ON HEGEMONY ISSUE, CHIAO HAS MADE IT EASIER FOR JAPAN TO MOVE IN PEKING'S DIRECTION. BY MAKING IT CLEAR THAT CHINA WILL NOT OBJECT TO A UNILATERAL JAPANESE STATEMENT ON HEGEMONY, HE HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR GOJ TO ACCOMMODATE SOVIET AND DOMESTIC CRITICS. AGREEMENT THAT NO ACTION REQUIRED BY HEGEMONY CLAUSE WILL HAVE SAME EFFECT.

14. IF PROSPECTS FOR EVENTUAL SOLUTION HAVE IMPROVED, IMMEDIATE PROGRESS IS UNLIKELY. FOR DOMESTIC REASONS MIKI AND MIYAZAWA WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO INTRODUCE AN ADDITIONAL, CONTROVERSIAL ELEMENT INTO THE CURRENT POLITICAL SCENE IN TOKYO ALREADY IN ROAR OVER PRICE HIKE BILLS. MIYAZAWA'S MENTION OF THE NEED BY PEKING FOR SEVERAL WEEKS TO REPLY PROBABLY REFLECTED THIS CONCERN AND HIS NOTION OF TIMING. WE ALSO SENSE, AND FUJITA EVEN SAID AS MUCH, THAT PRES FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA WILL HAVE IMPORTANT BEARING ON STRATEGY GOJ MIGHT FOLLOW WITH PFT. WITH THE GROUNDWORK FOR RESOLUTION OF HEGEMONY ISSUE CLARIFIED AND LAID BY THE MIYAZAWA-CHIAO TALKS, REAFFIRMATION BY US OF OPPOSITION TO HEGEMONY COULD HELP EASE GOJ PROBLEMS WITH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CRITICS.
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